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（2）　　Pgeoduetion　『野eekno丑ogy　an〔墨　Parets　Proe腿wewaeRも　of　NU臨璽翅：亙
　　　Toyota　went　to　enormous　effort　in　the　US　to　emulate　the　successful　production
system，　manufacturing　techniques，　and　parts　provision　system　of　the　mother　plant　of
Toyota　in　Takaoka．　ln　these　areas　there　are　big　differences　between　Japan　and
America，　and　Toyota　thought　that，　for　the　eflicient　production　of　small－sized　cars　at
least，　the　essential　elements　of　the　Toyota　method　should　be　adopted．
　　　The　main　priorities　of　the　Toyota　production　control　system，　the“Kanbaエ1　System”，
are　as　follows．　Firstly，　to　produce　what　isエ1ecessary，　as　much　as　llecessary，　whell　it
is　necessary，　while　keeping　minimum　stock．　Secondly，　to　encourage　all　employees　to
become　voluntarily　involved　in　the　improvement　of　the　production　system．
　　　But　these　essential　conditions　did　not　form　overnight　in　Japan　in　the　first　place（3’．
Therefore，　in’the　cooperative　production　with　GM，　where　there　was　of　course　no
historical　continuity，　precedent，　or　accumulation　of　experience　upon　which　to　build，
there　were　many　issues　which　had　to　be　confronted　right　from　the　beginning　con－
cerning　the　matter　of　technical　transfer．
　　　Table　3　indicates　the　production　techniques　and　parts　procurement　system　which
were　adopted　by　NUMMI．　Of　the　15　sub－headings，　eight　apply　to　the　former　（＠＠＠
＠＠（ID＠＠），　seven　to　the　latter　（＠＠（g）＠＠＠（［ll）），　and　four　apply　to　both　（＠＠＠＠）．
FollQwing　are　further　details　of　some　of　these　items，　beginning　with　the　production
system．
　　　Among　the　items　in　（A）　which　were　adopted　directly　from　the　Toyota　system，
Tab夏e　3Production　Technology　and　Parts　Procurement　of　NUMMI　（as　of　May　1989）
　（Source：　compiled　from　Toyota’s　publicity　data，　part！y　revised．）
Adopted　System Production　Techno1ogy　and　Parts　Procurement
（A）　Toyota　（Japanese）　System＠ New　setting　up　of　press　shop　in　the　plant
Ot　An　lntroduction　to　the　Toyota　production　system
＠　Quality　Control
＠　Realization　of　work　standard　through　improvement
　　　（“Kaizen”）　activity
＠　Adoption　of　Toyota－standard　drafting　system
（B）　Partly　Adjusted　Toyota
　　　　　（Japanese）　System
???Placement　of　hardware　at　the　coating　process
Parts　procurement　system　in　the　’垂撃≠獅
Toyota　drafting　system　and　inspection　system　（prob－
lems　occurred）
（C）　NUMMI　Original　System???Inclusion　of　repair　process　in　each　assembly　line
Setting　up　vanning　center　in　Toyota’s　Kamigo　plant
Quality　control　（introducing　the　inspection　process　into
the　assembly　process）
（D）　GM　（US）　System ????Basic　lay－out　of　the　first　and　second　floors　in　the　plant
Parts　procurement　from　outside　the　plant
Quality　control　（die　and　gauge）
GM－lnformation　Network　system
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　　　　（1）　Shows　the　new　setting　up　of　a　press　shop　in　the　plant．　GM　had　constructed
their　assembly　shop　and　press　shop　separately，　and　had　depended　on　long　distance
transportation　to　bring　pressed　parts　to　the　assembly　factory．　However，　Toyota　set
up　a　press　shop　near　the　body－process　in　the　assembly　factory，　taking　into　considera－
tion　that　using　long－distance　transpertation　would　have　a　tendency　to　heighten　the
ratio　of　rejected　parts　and　to　cause　diMculties　in　feed－back．
　　　　＠　Comprises　the　adoption　of　measures　such　as：　the　supply　of　parts　in’　small　1ots；
a　teamwork　system　based　on　group－leaders　and　team－leaders；　a　rotation　system　in　each
group　aiming　at　the　equalization　of　job　functions；　and　the　use　of　electronic　bulletin
boards　known　as　“Andon”　in　Toyota．
　　　＠　Shows　the　setting　up　of　an　inspection　shop　to　evaluate　materials　urnished　in
the　US．　lnspection　processes　were　also　set　up　in　each　manufacturing　process　and　an
inspection　standard　was　introduced　which　aimed　to　reaeh　or　surpass　the　quality　level
at　the　Takaoka　Plant　in　Japan．
　　　＠　Shows　Toyota’s　intention　to　realize　a　high　work　standard　by　the　introduction
of　improvement　activity（‘’．
　　　Among　the　items　in　（B），　which　show　the　partially　adjusted　Toyota　system，　the
placement　of　hardware　at　the　coating　process　is　of　particular　interest．　ln　this　process，
the　GM　system　involved　applying　one　undercoating　using　the　electrodeposition　method，
and　two　top　coatings；　altogether　three　coats　of　paint　ln　addition　to　this，　GM　had
also　set　up　an　independent　repair　booth．　At　NUMMI，　Toyota　set　up　hardware
equivalent　to　the　number　of　processes　and　included　the　repair　process，　using　a　partially
revised　Toyota　system．
　　　The　items　in　（C）　were　implemented　with　the　aim　of　faci1itating　the　smooth　and
trouble－free　operation　of　the　Toyota　production　system　in　the　US．　The　first　strategy
was　to　reconstruct　the　conveyers　into　a　form　which　would　include　the　repair　processes
in　each　line．　The　second　was　for　Toyota　to　introduce　the　inspection　processes　into
each　line，　in　contrast　to　GM’s　method　which　was　for　the　inspection　processes　to　be
at　the　end　of　the　production　flows．　Toyota　expected　the　new　method　to　encourage
prompt　quality　control　feed－back．
　　　Section　（D）　shows　where　the　GM　system　was　adopted．　To　mention　an　example，
the　layout　of　the　GM　assembly　line　on　the　first　fioor　and　coating　line　on　the　second
floor　were　adopted　by　NUMMI　without　any　changes．
　　　Regarding　parts　procurement，　（A）　＠　shows　that　the　Toyota－standard　drafting
sys．tem　was　introduced，　beca，use　it　was　felt　to　be　superior　to　GM’s．　Section　（B）　shows
the　partly　modified　Toyota　system，　＠　referring　to　purchase　management　ln　Japan，
partsmakers　are　flexible　in　adjusting　to　changes　in　the　automaker’s　quantity　of　output，
and　so　stock　turnover　is　good．　But　at　GM　the　custom　had　been　to　keep　a　large
storehouse　full　of　factory　and　safety　stock　because　of　the　American　partsmakers’
custom　of　supplying　large　quantity　lots　to　a　plant，　Toyota　implemented　a　poliey　of
stock　control，　reducing　the　amount　to　about　five　days’　stock．
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　　　　（B）　＠　shows　the　introduction　of　Toyota－style　parts　design　drafting　and　inspec－
tion　forms．　But　this　resulted　in　some　disorder　in　the　parts　procurement　at　NUMMI．
GM’s　parts　designs　contained　all　the　information　needed　to　produce　the　parts　without
further　information，　and　also　the　finished　parts　could　be　checked　against　the　design
draft，　Toyota’s　had　no　checking　system．　This　meant　that　in　cases　where　the　initial
draft　was　modified，　difficulties　arose　in　communicating　the　new　information　thoroughly
to　the　partsmakers．
　　　　（C）　＠　shows　the　parts　procurement　method　which　was　established　at　NUMMI．
Toyota　set　up　a　vanning　center　（packaging　and　shipping　center）　at　their　Kamigo
plant　and　transported　a　large　quantity　of　parts　（parts　for　30　cars／lot）　to　the　US．　But
in　the　NUMMI　plant　there　had　not　been　enough　space　set　aside　for　the　sorting　out　of
these　parts，　and　some　confusion　resulted．
　　　　Finally，　section　（D）　shows　where　the　GM　method　was　adopted．　ltem　＠　indicates
parts　procurement　from　outside　the　plant．　GM　had　been　using　train　transportation　for
the　supply　of　parts　in　large　lots．　Toyota　introduced　the　“Kanban　Systern”　in　an
attempt　to　lay　down　the　foundation　for　a　scheduled，　’曹浮≠獅狽奄狽≠狽奄魔?　and　small－lot　procure－
ment　system．　But　Toyota　could　apply　this　system　to　only　about　a　dozen　out　of　seventy
or　so　partsmakers，　including　those　involved　in　Japan－US’tie－ups．　As　for　the　rest　of　the
makers，　NUMMI　had　to　depend　on　daily　transportation　from　Chicago．
　　　　Item　＠　shows　how　NUMMI　adopted　the　GM　system　of　quality　control，　whereby　GM
had　been　lending　the　die　and　inspection　gauges　to　the　partsmkers，　and　then　performing
another　check－up　themselves　on　delivery．　Toyota　adopted　this　system　at　NUMMI　after
special　preparation：　for　example　they　performed　1000／o　inspections　at　first，　and　then
if　no　items　were　rejected　they　later　shifted　to　random　sampling．
　　　　Item　＠　shows　Toyota’s　decision　to　use　“GM－Net”，　the　exclusive　network　connecting
all　GM　plants　and　partsmakers　comprehensively．
　　　As　can　be　seen　from　the　above，　most　of　the　fifteen　items　concerned　with　production
techniques　and　parts　procurement　at　the　1oca1　・production　of’mUMMI　come　un er　（A），
（B）　and　（C），　indicating　clearly　that　quite　a　lot　of　Toyota－style　method　was　adopted．
This　was　a　significant　facter　behind　the　excellent　resUlts　which　fo11owed　soon　after　the
establishment　of　NUMMI．　ln　fact　the　results　were　more　than　had　been　anticipated
from　the　technology　transfer，　which　was　．Toyota’s　first　experience　of　local　production　in
the　US．　ln　other　words，　this　was　a　successful　transfer　of　Toyota’s　own　“Kanban
System”　to　GM，　which　had　not　been　ab1e　to　surpass　Japanese　automakers　even　when
they　tried　to　produce　sma．11－sized　cars　after　the　two　oil　shocks　of　the　1970　s．　The
success　is　particularly　notable　because　the　four　main　elements　comprised　in　“An　lntro－
duction　to　the　Toyota　Production　System”　（namely，　small－lot　parts　provision　to　the
assembly　line，　the　introduction　of　the　“teamwork　system”，　the　implementation　of　group
job　rotation，　and　putting　up　an　“Andon”　monitoring　signal）　had　all　been　looked　at
by　GM　and　other　US　automakers　but　had　not　taken　root．
　　　The　introduction　of　the　“Kanban　System”　ean　be　assumed　to　be　an　important
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factor　worthy　of　comment．　The　transaction　relationship　between　partsrriakers　and
automakers　was　very　different　in　the　US　and　in　Japan，　and　because　of　this　difference
there　was　some　doubt　一about　the　feasibility　of　transferring　the　“Kanban　System”
directly　to　the　US．　ln　Japan，　there　is　comprehensive　cooperation　regarding　the　division
of　labor　through　the　close　relationship　of　automakers　and　their　affiliated　partsmakers
which　is　not　seen　in　other　countries．　lt　is　considered　to　be　a　major　factor　in　raising
the　international　competitive　power　of　Japanese　automakers　to　the　highest　level．　ln
contrast，　in　the　US，　as，is　clear　in　the　GM　example，　in　most　cases　automakers　make
most　of　the　parts．　themse1ves，　from　the　battery　right　down　to　the　small　pressed　parts．
Therefore　the　relationship　of　automakers　and　partsmakers　has　been　thought　of　as
horizontal（5）．
　　　The　introduction　of　the　Toyota　system　in．　the　area　of　parts　procurement　has　proved
to　have　value　even　though　it　has　been　only　partly　implemented　among　US　partsmakers
（including　Japanese　subsidiary　partsm，akers）　because　of　the　diMculties　encountered．up
to　this　point．
　　　We　cannot　overlook　another　favorable　condition　which　has　backed　up　the　develop－
ment　of　the　Toyota　production　system　in　the　US　in　regard　to　loca1　parts　procurement．
This　is　that　in　1989　NUMMI　was　supplied　by　approximately　seventy　parts　paanufacturers，
with　about　600　parts　being　supplied　by　them　Ten　of　these　partsmakers　were　actually
GM’s　own　parts　divisions．　NUMMI　could　also　take　advantage　of　GM’s　long　history
of　transaction　with　local　superior　partsmakers，　being　in　a　position　to　establish　a　business
relationship　with　them．　in　advance　of　other　Japanese　or　joillt　venture　aIユtomakers
setting　up　in　the　US．
　　　The　latter　has　to　be　pointed　out　as　a　merit　of　joint　venture．　Similarly，　at　NUMMI，
Toyota　could　utilize　the　special　relationship　with　major　Toyota－subsidiary　partsmakers
which　were　investing　in　the　US　one　after　another　in　the　early　1980　s（6’．
（3）．Laber・Manageme飢醜ela伽囎at　NU瓢瓢互
　　　The　major　priority　in　deveioping　lqbor－personnel　policy　at　NUMMI　was　to　estab－
lish　a　line　in　union　management　cooperation　conducive　to　the　realization　of　high
productivity．
　　　Towards　this　end，　Toyota　repeatedly　conferred　with　the　UAW，　and　in　1983　they
rea’モ?ｅｄ　an’agreement　on　the　basic　policy一　for　establishing　favorable　industrial　relations
and　signed　a　protocol，　the　main　points　of　which　were　as　follows．　Firstly，　workers　who
were　previously　employed　by　GM　at　the　Fremont　・plant　will　be　employed　preferentially
by　NUMMI　and　the　UAW　will　suport　the　fu1filment　of　the　“Unique　Production　System”
of　the　joint　venture．　Secondly，　the　wage　levels　and　benefits　of　the　US　automobile
industry　are・to　be　applied　to　the　newly　employed　at　NUMMI．　Thirdly，　the　UAW
will　accept　Toyota’s　production　system　at　NUMMI，　which　is，based　on　teamwork　and
the　use　of　multi－skilled　workers（7’．
　　　From　April　1984　NUMMI　began　the　practice　of　empioying　group－leaders　and　team一
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1eaders，　with　the　intention　that　this　would　form　the　nucleus　of　the　production　field（8’．
Twenty－five　NUMMI　employees　were　dispatched　to　the　mother　plant　in　Takaoka　as　the
first　batch　for　training　in　Japan，　and　they　gained　experience　of　the　Toyota　production
system　with　on－the－job　training（9’．
　　　　In　1985，　a　laboT　agreement　was　concluded　following　the　terms　of　the　protocol　of
1983．　ln　the　agreement　it　was　confirmed　that　both　labor　and　management　would
cooperate　to　pToduce　the　highest　quality　cars　in　the　world　at　the　lowest　cost．　The
agreement　aimed　for　the　most　innovative　and　humanitarian　industrial　relations　and
included　an　agreement　that　there　would　be　no　lay－offs　except　in　the　case　of　serious
economic　recession　breaking　down　the　business　administration（iO）．
　　　　After　the　priority　employment　of　group　and　team－lead’ers，　NUMMI　continued　to
take　on　more　employees　from　the　autumn　of　1984，　and　with　full　attention　being　given
to　the　business　of　employment　the　employee　numbers　increased，　reaching　2500，　．as
P至anned，　by　the　end　of　1985，　and三n　the　beginning　of　1989　reaching　2700（1エ）．
　　　　By　occupational　categories，　employees　can　be　divided　into　400　oflice　workers　and
the　rest　technical　workers．　An　examination　of　the　present　cbndition　of　・labor－manage－
ment　relations　at　NUMMI　follows，　with　reference　to　Table　4．
　　　Section　（A）　shows　the　items　which　were　adopted　directly　from　the　Toyota　system．
Firstly，　a　generous　educatioR　and　training　system　for　employees　was　enacted．　This
was　not　systemized　at　GM，　but　in　the　Toyota　system　it　was　given　high　priority．　’This
was　because，　as　mentioned　before，　it　was　considered　an　essential　condition　of．’　qua1ity
TahEe　4　Labor－Managemcnt　Relations　at　NUMMI　（as　of　May　1989）
　　（Source：　compiled　from　Toyota’s　publicity　data，　partly　revised．）
Adopted　System Labor－Personnel　Poiicy
（A）　Toyota　（Japanese）　System??
??
Generous　educa宅ion　aロd　trainipg　system
Simpli行ed　job　furLction　structure，　introduction　of　rota一
　サtlon　system
Introduction　of　the　Team　and　Group　syste血
Industrial　harmony　policy
（B）　Partly　Adjusted　Toyota
　　　　　（Japanese）　System
＠　Pr motion　by　seniority　and　ability
（C）　NUMMI　Original　System????De ai’led　gelection　process　at　initial　employment
Rotation　system　aiming　at　the　equalization　of　labor
No　wage　distlnction　by　functions　or　seniority
Abolition　of　cafeteria　and　parking　lot　privileges　and
distinctions
（D）　GM　（US）　System
?
????
No　shift　alternation　between　daytime　and．　nighttime
work
No　other　allowances　but　living　allowance
Three－yearly　wage　negotiation
No　personnel　assessment，　no　bonus　system
Community　activities
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control　that　employees　voluntarily　become　involved　in　the　prompt　solution　of　produc－
tion　problems　and　the　improvement　and　enhanced　quality　of　the　production　system
With　this　in　rnind，　at　NUMMI，　Toyota　developed　educational　programs　focussing　on
work　standards，　quality　control，　problem－solving，　job　training　methods，　human　relation－
ships，　work　safety，　etc．
　　　Secondly，　there　was　a　simplification　of　the　job　function　structure，　and　the　job
rotation　system　was　introduced　into　each　team．　At　GM，　the　job　function　structure　had
been　subdivided　into　about　a　hundred　eategories　according　to　the　wage－rate　table，
calculated　by　ten　functions　times　ten　wage　rates．　Toyota　simplified　this　into　three
functions，　namely，　production　（2000　employees），　maintenance　（200　employees）　and　die
maintenance　（20　employees）．　Two　wage　ranks　introduced，　one　for　production　and　one
for　maintenance　（including　die　maintenance）．　The　rotation　system，　which　had　not
been　used　at　all　at　GM，　was　also　implemented，　aiming　for　equalization　in　the　labor
丘eldα2）．
　　　　Thirdly，　the　team　and　group　systems　were　introduced．　A　team　is　composed　of
five　to　six　workers　and　a　group　is　composed　of　three　to　four　teams．　This　kind　of
organization　is　indispensable　for　the　Toyota　system　which　is　based　on　teamwork．
There　was　nothing　equivalent　to　team－leaders　in　GM，　which　instead　had　a　peTpendicular
unitary　system　of　administration　of　all　employees　by　managers　or　foremen．　The　big
difference　in　this　system　was　that　although　GM’s　foremen　and　NUMMI’s　group－leaders
were　both　non－union　members，　the　foremen　had　enormous　authority，　almost　to　the　point
of　absolute　power．　A　foreman　adrninistered　20－30　employees，　and　had　employment
and　dismissal　rights　as　well．　Toyota，　therefore，　reduced　the　authority　of　group－leaders
to　prevent　the　demoralization　of　employees，　and　at　the　same　time　promoted　the　team－
leader　system，　devoting　the　most　effort　towards　establishing　an　atmosphere　of　teamwork
and　mutual　cooperation．
　　　　Fourthly，　Toyota　undertook　to　establish　industrial　harmony．　At　GM　it　was　taken
for　granted　by　both　labor　and　management　that　there　would　be　constant　antagonism
between　them．　ln　opposition　to　this　idea，　Toyota　held　a　series　of　meetings　promoting
a　different　standpoint；　that　of　acknowledging　the　necessity　in　the　Toyota　systern　of
harmony　and　reciprocai　trust　in　industrial　relations．　These　meetings　included　round－
table　gatherings，　production　explanation　meetings，　safety　meetings，　meetings　of　the
labor　section　and　union，　two－day　stucly　trips　of　the　personnel　seetioR　together　with　the
unlon，　etc．
　　　　Through　these　meetings　Toyota　tried　to　bring　about　better　understanding，　mutual
trust，　and　a　sharing　of　information　between　labor　and　management　Also，　when　problems
arose　at　the　working　place，　it　was　decided　to　cooperate　to　confirm　facts　instead　of
automatically　assuming　and　insisting　on　opposite　opinions　as　in　the　past
　　　　Section　（B）　shows　items　which　were　adopted　with　slight　adjustments　from　the
Toyota　system．　While　GM　had　set　up　estimate－standards　for　promotion　based　on　a
seniority　rule，　NUMMI　added　objective　evaluations　for　the　promotion　of　team－leaders．
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For　example，　after　closing　the　app｝ications　and　nominations　for　team－leaders，　which　were
open　to　ali　employees，　the　examiners’　selected　twe　each　from　labor　and　management　and
tested　them　using　such　criteria　as：　Can　he　deal　with　all　the　functions　of　team？　How
much　office　eduction　has　he　obtained？　How　much　creative　contribution　has　he　made？
How　is　his　oMce　attendance　record？　etc．　Then　there　were　interview　tests　carried　out
by　one　interviewer　each　from　labor　and　management，　and　the　prospective　team－leader’s
ability　was　assessed　in　a　summing　up　of　all　the　tests．
　　　　Section　（C）　shows　the　adoption　of　NUMMI’s　original　system．　Firstly，　they　imple－
mented　a　detailed　selection　process　at　the　initial　hiring　of　employees．　Both　the　paper
and　interview　employment　tests　of　GM　used　to　be　simple　and　there　were　quite　a　few
employments　through　recommendatioエ1s　from　the　union　or　through　personal　connections．
In　contrast，　as　mentioned　before，　a　fairly　detailed　test　was　introduced　by　NUMMI
including　such　elements　as　interview，　diseussion，　an　actual　technique　demonstratioR
test，　etc．
　　　　Secondly　the　rotation　system　was　introduced，　aiming　at　the　equalization　of　labor，
but　as　mentioned　in　Note　12，　this　did　not　｝ead　to　the　development　of　multi－skilled
workers　and　so　did　not　contribute　to　the　raising　of　productivity．
　　　　Thirdly，　wage　distinction　by　job　or　seniority　was　removed．　That　is　to　say，　instead
of　using　GM’s　complex　wage　ranking　system，　a　simplified　two－rank　system　was　intro－
duced（i3’．　There　was　no　discrimination　by　seniority，　however　for　employees　of　less
than　one　and　a　half　years　the　wage　rate　was　set　at　850／o．
　　　　Fourthly，　the　hierarchical　system　in　the　use　of　the　cafeteria　and　parking　lot　was
abolished．　ln　the　GM　period，　the　cafeteria　and　parking　lot　had　separate　areas　distin－
guished　by　job　classification，　but　this　system　was　repealed　in　oTder　te　impress　upon
the　employees　the　non－discriminatory　nature　of　the　Toyota　management　system（i‘）．
　　　　Section　（D）　Shows　items　which　were　adopted　from　GM’s　system．　Firstly，　day　and
night　shift　rotations　proved　impossible　to　realize．　This　was　said　to　be　caused　by　the
perception　in　the　US　of　daytime　workers　as　having　relatively　higher　status　than　night－
time　workers．
　　　　Secondly，　GM’s　system　of　miscellaneous　allowances　was　adopted；　the　living　al－
lowance　and　various　kinds　of　insurance，　and　the　additional　payment　of　60　cents／hour
for　team－leaders．　lt　must　be　mentioned　that　compared　with　the　Japanese　system，　GM’s
system　was　quite　a　simple　one．
　　　　Thirdly，　wage　negotiations　were　set　to　be　held　every　three　years（i5’，　and　fourthly，
Toyota’s　individual　employee　assessment　system　and　boRus　system　were　not　adopted．
It　can　be　assumed　that　GM’s　customs　were，　in　these　cases，　enforeed　by　circumstanees．
　　　　Fifthly，　as　a　part　of　the　community　activity　of　large　enterprises　which　is　general
in　the　US，　NUMMI　made　donatlons　to　the　loeal　university　and　so　on．
　　　　To　sum　up　what　has　been　mentioned　above，　the　Toyota　system　has　been　adopted
on　the　labor－personnel　policy　as　well　as　for　production　technology　and　parts　procure－
ment．　Out　of　fourteen　items　in　Table　4，　nine　items　come　under　（A），　（B），　or　（C）．
　94　Technology　Transfer　Strategy　of　Japanese　Automakers　in　the　United　States
In　fact，　as　a．reflection　of　the　success　of　the　establishment　of　industrial　harmonization，
absenteeism　decreased　sharply　from　around　200／o　in　the　GM　decade　to　around　30／o．
This　highlights　the　effects　of　the　labor－personnel　policy．　However，　in　comparison　with
the　transfer　of　production　technology　and　parts　procurement　systems，　NUMMI’s　abor－
personnel　policy　has　not　reached　the　level　of　Toyota’s　as　yet．　This　is　because　the
bases　of　the　Toyota　production　system－positive　development　of　quality　control　activi－
ties　through　the　education　and　training　system　and　teamwork，　and　promotion　of　multi－
skilled　workers　through　the　rotation　system－do　not　appear　to　have　reached　the
planned　leveL　lt　is　not　until　these　bases　are　firmly　rooted　and　functional　that　Toyota’s
technology　transfer　strategy　to　the　US　can　be　said　to　be　complete．
9
3 C膿¢亙鵬量⑪聡
　　　This　paper　presented　a　case　analysis　of　NUMMI，　the　joint　venture　of　Toyota　and
GM，　for　the　purpose　of　elucidating　the　unique　features　of　the　technology　transfer
strategy　of　Toyota．　From　the　analysis　it　can　be　seen　that，　in　regard　to　production
technology　and　parts　procurement，　Toyota　has　been　highly　successful．　lt　has　also
been　made　clear　that　in　regard　to　labor－management　relations　the　transferrai　isエ10t
yet　complete，　bqt　when　we　take　into　account　the　industrial　relations　and　labor　customs
peculiar　to　the　US　this　can　be　seen　as　a　natural　consequence．
　　　Regarding　the　transferral　of　the　production　system，　it　is　estimated　that　Toyota’s
technology－transfer　strategy　attained　results　even　better　than　anticipated，　and　this
success　was　brought　about　because　Toyota　was　flexible　in　the　implementation　of　the
production　system　at　NUMMI，　not　insisting　exclusively　on　Toyota　systems　but　making
adjustments　as　necessary，　introducing　original　NUMMI　systems　or　American　systems
when　called　for．
　　　At　US－based　plants　of　Japanese．automobile　manufacturers，　as　can　be　seen　from
the　exapaple　of　Toyota，　a　harmonization　between　Japan　and　the　US　is　being　at－
tempted．（i6’　lf　this　serves　to　boost　the　international　competitive　power　of　the　American
automobile　industry，　it　could　present　the　possibility　of　a　promising　solution　to　the　recently
worsening　Japan－US　automobile　trade　conflict．
（1）
））???（（
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Neteg
“Creativity　Lasts　Forever：50　Years　of　Toyota　History”，（in　Japanese；“Sozo　wa　Kagiri一
一naku：Toyota　Jidosha　50－nen　Shi”）．　Toyota　Motor　Corporation，　1987．　On　page　743　there
is　a　description　of　how，　after　the　merging　of　TMC　and　TMS，　the　Overseas　Technical
Department　of　TMC　was　integrated　with　the　Overseas　Assembly　Dep4rtment　of　TMS　to
become　the　new　Overseas　Produc．tion　Department．　Similarly，　the　Overseas　Business　De－
partment　of　TMC　was　integrated　with　the　Export　Business　Department　of　TMS　to　become
the　Overseas　Planning　Department．
Ibid．，　p．　717．
“Con’狽窒盾戟@of　Outside　Orders　and　Subcontractors　in　Low　Growth　Economy　Period”　（in
Japanese；　“Teiseichoki　ni　okeru　Gaichu－Shitauke　Kanri”），　Yoshio　Sato　（compiled），　Chuori
Keizai－Sha，　1980，　“Stagnation　of　Low　Growth　Economy　and　Transformation　of　the　Make
（4）
（5）
（6）
））???（（
（9）
（10）
（11）
（12）
（13）
（14）
（15）
（16）
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or　Buy　Policies　of　Automakers”，　（in　Japanese；　“Teiseicho　no　Telchaku　to　Jidosha－Meikaa
no　Nai－Gai－Seisaku　no　Henbo”，　pp．　222－23．
The　work　standard，　as　it　applies　to　the　Toyota　production　system，　is　implemented　through
the　process　of　encouraging　individual　commitment　towards　the　goal　of　attaining　the　most
eMcient　production　system，　with　each　worker　keeping　in　mind　the　constant　improvement
of　each　job　sequence　and　method．　Thus，　when　trouble　occurs　during　operation，　workers
can　stop　the　production　line　until　the　cause　of　the　trouble　has　been　pinpointed　and　im－
provement　has　been　effected．　ln　practice，　the　numbers　of　line　stops　is　recognized　as　hav－
ing　a　tendency　to　decrease　as　workers　become　adapted　and　accustomed　to　this　work
standard．　ln　the　beginning　there　was　some　anxiety　about　the　frequency　of　line　stops　at
NUMMI，　but　the　end　result　was　positive，　and　it　was　even　mentioBed　that　this　practice
had　the　merit　of　drawing　attention　to　the　issue　of　improvement．
“Technological　Strategy　of　Japanese　Auto－parts　lndustry”　（in　Japanese；　“Gendai　Nippon
no　Jidosha　Buhin　Kogyo”，　Taku　Oshirria　（compiled），　Nippon　Keizai－Hyoron－Sha，　1987，
pp．　1－3．
The　Toyota－subsidiary　major　partsmakers　investing　in　the　US　are：　Nippon　Denso，　Aishin
Seiki，　Tokai　Rika　Denki　Seisakusho，　Toyota　Gosei，　and　so　on．
“NUMMI　lnformation”，　NUMMI，　1987，　pp．　1－2，
The　team－leaders　are　the　equivalent　of　“Hancho”　in　the　Japanese　system，　and　are　union
members．　Group－leaders　are　the　equivalent　of　“Kumicho”　or　“Kocho”，　but　are　not　union
mernbers．　Both　leaders　take　on　the　duty　of　the　education　and　training　of　members　of　the
group　or　team．
“Creativity　Lasts　Forever”，　op．　cit．，　pp．　799－800．
“NUMMI　lnformation”，　op．　cit．，　p．　4．
ibid．，　pp．　2－3．
According　to　this，　3000　of　5000　exmGM　Frerr｝ont　plant　employees　took　the　employment　test
and　2200　passed，　That　means　that　the　rate　of　exhGM　workers　to　newly　employed　workers
was　as　high　as　800／o．
Toyota　intended　to　introduce　this　system　with　the　aim　of　producing　multi－skilled　workers，
and　thereby　increasing　productivity．　At　NUMMI　the　main　priority　was　the　equalization
of　labor，　and　according　to　Toyota　the　system　was　not　a　factor　in　raising　productivity．
According　to　Toyota’s　records，　the　average　hourly　wage　for　workers　in　production，　main－
tenance　or　die　maintenance　is　＄15．00．　The　group－leaders　standard　annual　salary　（paid
monthly）　is　40－55　thousand　dollars，
In　fact，　in　Japan，　this　privilege　system　has　yet　to　be　abolished．　lt　is’said　that　open
cafeterias　lose　the　merit　of　being　possible　venues　for　lunchtime　meetings．
The　three－yearly　wage　negotiation　is　held　for　time－wage　workers．　Negotiations　for　month－
ly　salary　workers　are　held　annually，　in　April．
For　a　review　of　the　Mazda　situation，　see　Taku　Oshima，　“Technology　Transfer　Strategy
of　Japanese　Automakers　in　the　United　States：　Mazda　Motor　Corporation　Case　Study，”
（Report　for　the　lnternational　Motor　Vehicle　Program，　Massachusetts　lnstitute　of　Technology），
May　1989．
